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A growing number of prosecutors are running and winning 
elections on criminal justice reform platforms of progressive 
prosecution.1  For many of these progressive prosecutors, correcting 
wrongful convictions is a key platform issue.2  Whereas the twentieth 
century prosecutor may have blocked defendants’ access to 
postconviction DNA testing and opposed innocence claims,3 the 
twenty-first century progressive prosecutor is lauded for inviting 
 
* Elizabeth Webster, Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor at Loyola University Chicago. 
This project was supported by Grant Number (2017-IJ-CX-0012), awarded by the National 
Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.  Any opinions, 
findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this presentation are those of the 
author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Justice. 
1 Sam Reisman, The Rise of the Progressive Prosecutor, LAW360 (Apr. 7, 2019, 8:02PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1145615/the-rise-of-the-progressive-prosecutor [https://
perma.cc/5DGH-U7GU]. 
2 See, for example, the following district attorney campaign websites: On the Issues, 
KRASNER FOR DA, https://krasnerforda.com/platform [https://perma.cc/4MVU-DBZW] (listing 
“[r]eview past convictions, free the wrongfully convicted” as the second item under “[e]nd mass 
incarceration”); Initiatives, ERIC GONZALEZ FOR BROOKLYN DA, https://www.ericgonzalez.com
/initiatives [https://perma.cc/5KBM-G6W2] (noting that Eric Gonzalez and Ken Thompson 
“created a Convictions Review Unit that has since become a model for the country”); Issues, 
Wrongful Convictions Unit, CHESA BOUDIN FOR DISTRICT ATT’Y 2019 (Apr. 30, 2019), https://
www.chesaboudin.com/wrongful_convictions [https://perma.cc/46PE-4JE9] (“As San Francisco 
District Attorney, Chesa Boudin will: Establish a Wrongful Conviction Unit . . . .”). 
3 See generally Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One’s Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel 
Vision, 49 HOW. L.J. 475, 475 (2006) (discussing prosecutors’ reticence to reevaluate convictions 
even after evidence of guilt has been discredited); Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: 
Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 130 (2004) 
(discussing how the institutional culture of prosecutors’ offices and political pressures 
encourage prosecutors’ to resist innocence claims); Hilary S. Ritter, It’s the Prosecution’s Story, 
but They’re Not Sticking to It: Applying Harmless Error and Judicial Estoppel to Exculpatory 
Post-Conviction DNS Testing Cases, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 825, 827 (2005) (discussing how some 
prosecutors would rather invent a new theory of the crime rather than acknowledge errors 
discovered through postconviction DNA testing). 
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innocence claims and implementing a unit to review them.4  Legal 
scholarship has only recently begun to explore these developments.5 
Much of the recent research has focused on the high-profile efforts 
of district attorneys implementing conviction integrity units (CIU)—
also known as conviction review units (CRU).6  Considering the rapid 
rise and innovation of CIUs,7 this scholarly emphasis is more than 
justified.  Still, many small to medium-sized and under resourced 
jurisdictions may not find it feasible to create, staff, and fund a 
standing CIU.8  Indeed, they may not have the caseload to justify 
one.9  Given the realities of limited resources and variable caseloads, 
how are prosecutors’ offices developing standards and practices to 
address postconviction innocence review?  What criteria are they 
adopting for accepting or rejecting cases to review? 
I explore answers to these questions through semi-structured 
interviews with twenty prosecutors (nine working in conviction 
integrity units) who have proactively assisted with an exoneration.  I 
 
4 See Peter Neufeld, Legal and Ethical Implications of Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, 
35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 639, 641 (2001) (“Increasingly, progressive-minded prosecutors around 
the country are setting up their own ‘innocence projects.’”). 
5 See, e.g., Dana Carver Boehm, The New Prosecutor’s Dilemma: Prosecutorial Ethics and 
the Evaluation of Actual Innocence, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 613, 617 (2014); Daniel Kroepsch, 
Prosecutorial Best Practices Committees and Conviction Integrity Units: How Internal 
Programs Are Fulfilling the Prosecutor’s Duty to Serve Justice, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1095, 
1096 (2016); John Hollway, Conviction Review Units: A National Perspective 8, 10 (Univ. of 
Penn. Faculty Scholarship, Paper No. 1614, Apr. 2016); see also CTR. ON THE ADMIN. OF 
CRIMINAL LAW, ESTABLISHING CONVICTION INTEGRITY PROGRAMS IN PROSECUTORS’ OFFICES 12 
(2012) [hereinafter CONVICTION INTEGRITY PROJECT], http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default
/files/upload_documents/Establishing_Conviction_Integrity_Programs_FinalReport_ecm_pro
_073583.pdf [https://perma.cc/SET2-399E]; Barry Scheck, Professional and Conviction Integrity 
Programs: Why We Need Them, Why They Will Work, and Models for Creating Them, 31 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2215, 2217–18 (2010); Barry C. Scheck, Conviction Integrity Units Revisited, 
14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 705, 705 (2017) [hereinafter Scheck, Conviction Integrity Units 
Revisited]; Cyrus R. Vance Jr., The Conscience and Culture of a Prosecutor, 50 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 629, 631 (2013); Mike Ware, Dallas County Conviction Integrity Unit and the Importance 
of Getting It Right the First Time, 56 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 1033, 1034 (2011). 
6 See Scheck, Conviction Integrity Units Revisited, supra note 5, at 705. 
7 See Conviction Integrity Units, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS 1 (Feb. 3, 2016), https://
www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/2.2016_Newsletter_Art2.pdf [https://
perma.cc/YAJ2-B3RF] [hereinafter Conviction Integrity Units 2016]. 
8 See id. at 21 (“It should be noted, though, that many smaller state or local prosecutors’ 
offices may lack the resources to separately staff a CRU.”); see also CONVICTION INTEGRITY 
PROJECT, supra note 5, at 8 (“While conviction integrity reforms have been implemented in 
larger district attorneys’ offices, this Report recognizes that the majority of prosecutors’ offices 
do not have the number of personnel or the resources that are available to larger offices.”). 
9 See Elizabeth Webster, The Prosecutor as a Final Safeguard Against False Convictions: 
How Prosecutors Assist with Exoneration, 110 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 245, 281–82 (2020) 
(“Prosecutors from small jurisdictions (population 500,000 or less), and medium jurisdictions 
(population between 500,000 and one million) generally lacked the resources or the caseload to 
staff a full-time CIU or even a separate appellate division.”). 
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examine how prosecutors adopt legal standards, how they evaluate 
both forensic and non-forensic new evidence of innocence, and how 
and when they acknowledge innocence—all in the context of the 
highly discretionary postconviction arena.10  Findings suggest that 
prosecutors have adjusted to twenty-first century expectations of 
postconviction justice in different ways.  While some have adapted 
well beyond the DNA revolution,11 others continue to define 
innocence claims as those that can be subjected to some type of 
postconviction forensic testing and/or that can establish the identity 
of the actual perpetrator.12  Prosecutors’ postconviction 
determinations take on special significance as DNA technology 
advances,13 outdated forensic disciplines face newfound scrutiny,14 
and recantation evidence increasingly contributes to overturning 
known wrongful convictions.15 
The interviews reported here shed light on postconviction 
prosecution from those in the vanguard.  Results report a variety of 
progressive actions that prosecutors are taking to correct wrongful 
convictions.  These include: 1) adopting an interests of justice 
mindset rather than requiring affirmative proof of innocence; 
2) evaluating innocence claims with a broad view of what could be 
dispositive, not only forensic evidence like DNA and fingerprints, but 
 
10 See Fred C. Zacharias, The Role of Prosecutors in Serving Justice after Convictions, 58 
VAND. L. REV. 171, 173 (2005) (“Prosecutorial discretion is at its height in the postconviction 
context.”). 
11 The DNA revolution broadly refers to the wave of DNA exonerations leading to criminal 
justice system reforms.  See Medwed, supra note 3, at 126–27, 133 (“The DNA revolution and 
the resulting series of exonerations have put the spotlight on prosecutors’ treatment of 
postconviction motions, spurring at least one set of scholars . . . .”); see also Daniel S. Medwed, 
Talking About a Revolution: A Quarter Century of DNA Exonerations, in WRONGFUL 
CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF FREEING THE INNOCENT 2, 
3–4 (Daniel S. Medwed ed., 2017). 
12 See Medwed, supra note 3, at 131–32. 
13 See Keith A. Findley, Flawed Science and the New Wave of Innocents, in WRONGFUL 
CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION, supra note 11, at 184, 186–87 (“While DNA continues 
to exonerate, increasingly the DNA cases push the envelope of the technology and the 
evidence.”). 
14 See id. at 187 (“[T]he future of the Innocence Movement will be built to a large extent on 
showing that scientific evidence is frequently wrong.”); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Debunked, 
Discredited, but Still Defended Revising State Post-Conviction Relief Statutes to Cover 
Convictions Resting on Subsequently Invalidated Expert Testimony, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 
1095, 1099 (2018) (“In the future the courts will probably face a large number of cases in which 
the basis for relief is the claim that subsequent scientific research has invalidated expert 
testimony that contributed to the prior conviction.”). 
15 See ALEXANDRA E. GROSS & SAMUEL R. GROSS, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, 
WITNESS RECANTATION STUDY: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS 1, 2 (2013) (finding that 250 of the first 
1,068 cases in the National Registry of Exonerations database involved post-conviction 
recantations by witnesses or victims); Rob Warden, Reacting to Recantations, in WRONGFUL 
CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION, supra note 11, at 106, 106. 
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also new witnesses and recantations; 3) conducting active 
reinvestigations independent of law enforcement when necessary; 
4) viewing DNA, and other forensic evidence, in the larger context of 
the total investigation representing one piece of a puzzle rather than 
the sole factor in determining innocence; and 5) participating in 
reevaluation of past convictions featuring faulty forensic testimony 
and outdated forensic methods. 
I begin by describing the study and explaining how findings might 
shed light on progressive prosecution in the postconviction stage.  In 
Part II, I discuss progressive prosecution as it relates to the creation 
and rising popularity of conviction integrity units and also for 
prosecutors’ postconviction standards of case review and dismissal.  
In Part III, I report some of the key points of variation between 
prosecutor respondents in their postconviction innocence review 
standards and practices.  In Part IV, I analyze what this variation 
suggests about the future of postconviction innocence review and the 
challenges that twenty-first century prosecutors will face in their 
postconviction decision making. 
I. THE PROSECUTOR INTERVIEWS 
Interviews for this study were conducted between April 2016 and 
November 2018 with participating prosecutors who had assisted with 
at least one exoneration case as listed by the National Registry of 
Exonerations (“NRE”), an open source online database tracking US 
exoneration cases since 1989.16  The NRE definition of exoneration 
depends upon evidence of innocence, but not an explicit declaration 
of innocence.17  Defendants may have been pardoned, acquitted, 
posthumously exonerated, or had their cases dismissed by a 
prosecutor or a judge.18  In order to be eligible for this study, however, 
prosecutors must have made some proactive attempt to help bring 
about the exoneration.  Therefore, all prosecutor respondents had 
either recommended that the case be dismissed, joined in a defense 
motion to dismiss, or recommended that the defendant receive a 
pardon.  In addition, some prosecutor respondents initiated a 
reinvestigation, paid for postconviction DNA testing, publicly 
apologized to the defendant, and more. 
 
16 See NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration
/Pages/about.aspx [https://perma.cc/P3F2-KMK6]. 
17 See Glossary, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special
/exoneration/Pages/glossary.aspx [https://perma.cc/TB2J-YDFD] (providing a precise definition 
of “exoneration” as applied to NRE cases). 
18 See id. 
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Cases not eligible for the study would include those in which 
prosecutors appealed court decisions to retry a case after new 
evidence of innocence emerged or unsuccessfully retried the case but 
the defendant was acquitted.  The prosecutors in this sample have all 
participated in pro-active dismissals, not the re-active dismissals 
that a prosecutor might recommend after appeals have been lost and 
the option to re-prosecute is no longer an option.  This type of re-
active dismissal would not qualify as prosecutorial assistance. 
Prosecutors’ conviction review efforts have extended beyond 
reviewing actual innocence claims as well.  Some CIUs have 
broadened their focus to include cases of excessive sentencing, or 
cases in which a “serious violation of a defendant’s rights” has 
occurred.19  While these efforts qualify as progressive prosecution, 
prosecutor interviewees were not asked to speak about them, 
therefore, this study limits its focus to only those cases featuring a 
claim of innocence and an exoneration as recognized by the NRE. 
Prosecutor respondents come from jurisdictions all over the U.S., 
and of varying sizes.  As is indicative of the profession,20 18 of 20 
prosecutors (90%) were white and 13 of 20 were male (65%).  All had 
at least ten years of experience as attorneys, though not necessarily 
in prosecution.  In fact, 6 of the 20 respondents had previous 
experience as defense attorneys, due in part to the common practice 
of appointing former defense attorneys to head the district attorney’s 
office conviction integrity unit.21  See full demographics for 
prosecutor respondents in table 1. 
  
 
19 BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., 21 PRINCIPLES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY PROSECUTOR 16 (2018), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/FJP_21Principles_FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T2GB-KYNV] (“Consider extending the CRU’s mandate beyond claims of 
actual innocence by also scrutinizing cases in which a serious violation of a defendant’s rights 
or other miscarriages of justice may have contributed to his or her conviction.”). 
20 See White Men Dominate Elected Prosecutor Seats Nationwide; 60% of States have No 
Elected Black Prosecutors, WOMEN DONORS NETWORK (Jul. 7, 2015), https://womendonors.org
/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/press-release.pdf [https://perma.cc/2AY8-TJR3]. 
21 See Scheck, Conviction Integrity Units Revisited, supra note 5, at 738 (discussing staffing 
recommendations for CIUs). 
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Table 1.  Prosecutor Respondents (N=20) (Response Rate=50%) 
  N    N 
Race   Career stage as an attorney  
 White  18   Early (less than 10 years) 0 
 Non-white 2   Mid (10 to 20 years) 10 
Gender    Late (more than 20 years) 7 
 Male 13   Retired 1 
 Female 7   No longer a prosecutor 2 
Type   Geographic region  
 Elected district attorney 5   Northeast 5 
 Appellate attorney 2   Midwest 5 
 Supervising trial attorney 4   South 6 
 CIU 9   West 4 
Experience as opposing counsel   Jurisdiction size  
 Yes 6   Small (less than 500,000) 3 
 No 14   Medium (500,000 to 1 million) 7 
     Large (more than 1 million 10 
During sixty- to ninety-minute interviews, prosecutors were asked 
to speak about their office’s handling of a specific exoneration case in 
detail.  Specifically, “what evidentiary issues were under review?”  
Not all prosecutors chose to do so; some wished to reference a larger 
set of exoneration cases, for example, all of those secured under the 
conviction integrity unit, others refrained out of concern for potential 
civil litigation involving the exonerated defendant.  Demographics 
about the fifteen cases discussed in detail appear in table 2.  In 
addition, all prosecutors were asked about their postconviction 
innocence review in general, specifically, “Could you summarize the 
criteria that the office uses to decide how to respond to postconviction 
evidence of innocence?” and “Does your office have a procedure for 
investigating claims of actual innocence?”22 
  
 
22 The complete interview guide is available from the author upon request. 
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Table 2.  Exoneration Cases (N=15) 
  N    N 
Defendant Race   Exonerating Evidence*  
 White  5   DNA 7 
 Black 9   Non-DNA forensic 5 
 Hispanic/Other 1   New witness 2 
Gender    Recantation 3 
 Male 15   Alternative Suspect identified 3 
 Female 0   Evidence of official misconduct 3 
Offense   Contributing factor of wrongful conviction*  
 Murder 10   Mistaken witness ID 7 
 Sexual assault 4   False confession 2 
 Robbery 1   Perjury or false accusation 8 
Case Disposition    Official misconduct 8 
 Plea 2   False or misleading forensic evidence 5 
 Trial 13   Inadequate legal defense 1 
*will not total to 15      
II. PROGRESSIVE POSTCONVICTION PRACTICES 
IN INNOCENCE REVIEW 
What does it mean for a prosecutor to be “progressive”?  A series of 
articles addressing the topic provide guidance, but not an explicit 
definition.23  Sklansky’s The Progressive Prosecutor’s Handbook 
argues that there is “no roadmap” for newly elected progressive 
district attorneys, but suggests that there is a mandate including 
racial justice, addressing and correcting wrongful convictions, 
greater accountability for police and prosecutors, and reducing mass 
incarceration.24  By using the term “progressive prosecution,” I mean 
to refer to prosecutors embracing this mandate.  I focus on 
progressive prosecutorial actions—namely, the progressive act of 
assisting a wrongfully convicted defendant in achieving their 
exoneration, rather than on progressive prosecutorial politics.  As for 
a broader definition, progressive prosecutors—whether they are 
 
23 See, e.g., David Alan Sklansky, The Changing Political Landscape for Elected Prosecutors, 
14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 647, 653 (2017); David Alan Sklansky, The Progressive Prosecutor’s 
Handbook, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 25, 32 (2017) [hereinafter Sklansky, Progressive 
Prosecutor’s Handbook] (examining suggestion number four on page thirty-two that states 
“build in second looks” includes conviction integrity units); Note, The Paradox of “Progressive 
Prosecution”, 132 HARV. L. REV. 748, 751–52, 755 (2018). 
24 Sklansky, Progressive Prosecutor’s Handbook, supra note 23, at 26–27 (“Over the past few 
years, though, a growing number of chief prosecutors have won office by pledging a more 
balanced approach to criminal justice—more attentive to racial disparities, the risk of wrongful 
conviction, the problem of police violence, and the failures and terrible costs of mass 
incarceration.”). 
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established or newly elected—recognize the need for criminal justice 
reforms, and they seek out innovative solutions. 
Traditionally, prosecutors have resisted acknowledging errors and 
facilitating efforts to overturn false convictions.25  In a study of 260 
wrongful conviction cases, Gould and Leo find that the same evidence 
that might compel a prosecutor to reconsider taking a case to trial 
would be considered insufficient evidence for postconviction relief.26  
They write, 
Judges, prosecutors, and law enforcement are requiring proof 
of another suspect’s involvement or exculpatory DNA results to 
exonerate an innocent defendant.  Yet these same officials are 
willing to consider other forms of exculpatory evidence when 
releasing an innocent suspect following charges but prior to 
conviction.  It is not as if the defendants are any more innocent 
of the crime prior to trial than after conviction.  Rather, the 
badge of guilt conveyed by a conviction seems to make officials 
unwilling to consider multiple types of exculpatory evidence 
or actively pursue the matter on their own.27 
The authors identify eighteen different categories of people who 
played a “significant role” in bringing about the 260 exonerations; 
prosecutors played a significant role in only nine percent of these 
cases.28  My own study of prosecutorial assistance from a sample of 
1,610 exonerations listed by the NRE finds that prosecutors provided 
some level of assistance in about one-third of the cases and provided 
significant assistance in only eighteen percent of the cases.29  
Together, these findings suggest that, when confronted with new 
evidence of innocence, prosecutors are much more likely to either 
take no supportive action at all or to resist and oppose it than they 
are to actively pursue. 
 
25 See Bandes, supra note 3, 475. 
26 See Jon B. Gould & Richard A. Leo, The Path to Exoneration, 79 ALB. L. REV. 325, 332, 
371 (2016). 
27 Id. at 371 (emphasis added). 
28 See id. at 343–44 (“By ‘significant role,’ we mean engaged in substantial investigation or 
advocacy.”). 
29 See Elizabeth Webster, A Postconviction Mentality: Prosecutorial Assistance in 
Exoneration Cases, 36 JUST. Q. 323, 333 (2017) (examining the complete description of the types 
of prosecutorial actions categorized as “minor” or “major” prosecutorial assistance). 
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A. Creation and Rising Popularity of 
Conviction Integrity Units 
Former Dallas County District Attorney Craig Watkins received 
national acclaim for creating one of the first conviction integrity units 
in 2007.30  Watkins, who was Dallas County’s first African American 
district attorney, was successful not only for addressing the 
jurisdiction’s legacy of wrongful convictions, but its deep-seated 
racial biases as well.31  A decade before the “progressive prosecution” 
movement began, Watkins was challenging assumptions of the 
prosecutors’ role with his celebrated “smart on crime” approach.32 
Today, scholars and advocates of progressive prosecution 
recommend that prosecutors create a conviction integrity unit to 
uncover wrongful convictions.33  Sklansky cites discovering wrongful 
convictions among his ten suggestions for any progressive 
prosecutor.34  Likewise, the Fair and Just Prosecution project 
recommends that a “21st century prosecutor” should create a 
conviction review unit.35 
Conviction integrity units have grown increasingly popular in the 
past decade.36  The NRE lists sixty-two currently active CIUs across 
the country, mostly in large jurisdictions.37  This number has more 
 
30 See Elizabeth Barber, Dallas Targets Wrongful Convictions, and Revolution Starts to 
Spread, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (May 25, 2014), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice
/2014/0525/Dallas-targets-wrongful-convictions-and-revolution-starts-to-spread [https://perma
.cc/SA4A-G6L9]; Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Dallas County District Attorney a Hero to the 
Wrongfully Convicted, L.A. TIMES (May 8, 2012, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/world/la-
xpm-2012-may-08-la-na-dallas-district-attorney-20120509-story.html [https://perma.cc/YBB2-
9CB6]; see also Daniel S. Medwed, The Prosecutor as Minister of Justice: Preaching to the 
Unconverted from the Post-Conviction Pulpit, 84 WASH. L. REV. 35, 62 (2009) (“The Dallas 
County, Texas program may serve as the best model for other prosecutorial offices to replicate 
in forming internal innocence divisions.”). 
31 See Barber, supra note 30; Race: Dallas District Attorney Supports Racial Justice Act for 
Texas, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Jan. 23, 2013), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/race-
dallas-district-attorney-supports-racial-justice-act-for-texas [https://perma.cc/E6WU-P7TC]. 
32 Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., The “Smart on Crime” Prosecutor, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 905, 
911–12 (2012) (“Other local prosecutors have endorsed the ‘smart on crime’ approach as 
well. . . . Dallas County District Attorney Craig Watkins has received a great deal of media 
attention because of his work to identify cases of wrongful convictions within the jurisdiction.”).  
See Sklansky, Progressive Prosecutor’s Handbook, supra note 23, at 32. 
33 See Sklansky, Progressive Prosecutor’s Handbook, supra note 23, at 32–33 (recommending 
that prosecutor’s “build in second looks” including conviction integrity units); BRENNAN CTR. 
FOR JUST., supra note 19, at 16 (recommending the creation of effective conviction review). 
34 See Sklansky, Progressive Prosecutor’s Handbook, supra note 23, at 32–33. 
35 See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., supra note 19, at 16. 
36 See Conviction Integrity Units 2016, supra note 7, at 1 (“There were 24 CIUs in the United 
States in 2015, double the number in 2013 and quadruple the number in 2011.”). 
37 See Exoneration Detail List, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu
/special/exoneration/Pages/detaillist.aspx [https://perma.cc/Q97U-MMX8] (filter for CIU 
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than doubled in the past five years, when the NRE reported only 
twenty-four CIUs in existence in 2015.38  Five years before that, there 
were only four.39  CIUs have accomplished a lot in a short time: 
together, these units have exonerated 440 people,40 launched large-
scale case reviews,41 and implemented new office policies to prevent 
future wrongful convictions.42 
However, not all CIUs are doing progressive work.  Some units 
might be better characterized as “conviction preservation units” that 
merely maintain the status quo.43  They have been criticized as “mere 
window dressing[s] or public relations ploys.”44  Others have been 
implemented as an empty campaign promise.45  The NRE 
summarizes the situation: “In a few counties, CIUs have become 
important, active on-going operations.  For several CIUs, it’s too early 
to say.  And for others, we found no evidence that they have done 
anything much at all.”46  Currently, the NRE lists about half of the 
 
exonerations; archival link shows count at press time); Conviction Integrity Units, NAT’L 
REGISTRY EXONERATIONS https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Conviction-
Integrity-Units.aspx [https://perma.cc/GB8P-FQ7G] [hereinafter Conviction Integrity Units].  
Jurisdictions represented include Manhattan, Brooklyn, and the Bronx, as well as Dallas, 
Houston, Los Angeles, Chicago, Boston, Tampa, and many more.  See id. (as of August 4, 2020). 
38 See Conviction Integrity Units 2016, supra note 7 (“There were 24 CIUs in the United 
States in 2015, double the number in 2013 and quadruple the number in 2011.”). 
39 See id. 
40 See Exoneration Detail List, supra note 37. 
41 See Inger H. Chandler, Conviction Integrity Review Units: Owning the Past, Changing the 
Future, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2016, at 14, 16 (writing about three Texas CIUs). 
Beyond their “traditional” roles, the unit chiefs are actively involved with the Texas 
Forensic Science Commission, one of the guiding forces behind forensic science reform in 
Texas.  Through that participation, the Texas units have been on the forefront of case 
reviews involving DNA mixture interpretation, hair microscopy, and bite marks. 
Id. 
42 See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Enhancing the Justice Mission in the Exercise of Prosecutorial 
Discretion, 19 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 343, 354–56 (2010) (highlighting the Dallas 
County Conviction Integrity Unit, which discovered that prosecutors had failed to disclose 
exculpatory evidence by reviewing wrongful conviction cases, for its changes to hiring practices 
to ensure better compliance with Brady obligations). 
43 Hollway, supra note 5, at 19 & n.25. 
44 Exonerations in 2017, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS 15 (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www
.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/ExonerationsIn2017.pdf [https://perma.cc
/MMU2-X5FE]. 
45 See, e.g., John Simerman, Orleans DA, Innocence Project Team to Find Unjust 
Convictions, NOLA (Aug. 31, 2014, 4:28 PM), https://www.nola.com/article_38fb87ba-9fab-5f0e-
9753-b6515933fe3c.html [https://perma.cc/LX2S-L43S]; John Simerman, Cannizzaro, 
Innocence Project Call it Quits on Project to Unearth False Convictions, NOLA (Jan. 11, 2016, 
4:33 PM), https://www.nola.com/article_44ce1702-dd2b-5100-87de-f6e3e5b7c9f6.html [https://
perma.cc/LQW3-KXGC]. 
46 See Conviction Integrity Units 2016, supra note 7, at 2. 
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active units as having produced no recorded exonerations.47  
Therefore, simply having a CIU does not a progressive district 
attorney’s office make.  CIUs, however popular, cannot be the only 
metric by which to evaluate what prosecutors have accomplished in 
the postconviction arena. 
B. Prosecutors’ Postconviction Standards of Review and 
Dismissal for Wrongful Convictions 
In evaluating postconviction reform efforts, instead of merely 
noting the existence of CIUs, we might look into the prosecution’s 
willingness to review a variety of postconviction claims of innocence 
and their willingness to dismiss when the evidence no longer 
supports the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.  The prosecution’s 
flexibility in pursuing new evidence of innocence in its various 
forms—whether that be a request for postconviction DNA testing, a 
reanalysis of forensic evidence that reflects new scientific 
developments, or a recantation statement—will be reflected in the 
prosecutors’ standard to review innocence claims and to dismiss 
wrongful convictions.  Increasingly, postconviction DNA testing plays 
less of a pivotal role in innocence claims; most evidence that could 
have been subjected to DNA testing would have been tested at the 
trial level already.48  The black-and-white DNA exonerations have 
become less common; and, as DNA testing becomes more sensitive, it 
also becomes less dispositive in certain applications.49  Therefore, 
greater reliance on non-DNA and even non-forensic methods of 
evaluating wrongful conviction claims can be anticipated. 
Without the black-and-white certainty of DNA, prosecutors find 
themselves confronted with more grey-area cases.  How should they 
proceed?  Innocence Project Co-Director Barry Scheck argues that 
prosecutors should pursue conviction review even in cases that may 
not provide unequivocal proof of innocence (e.g., DNA).50  Scheck and 
 
47 See Conviction Integrity Units, supra note 37 (as of August 4, 2020). 
48 See Findley, supra note 13, at 185 (“As DNA became routinely tested before trial, at least 
in serious crimes, the pool of cases with untested material was bound to shrink.”). 
49 See id. at 186 (“Post-conviction DNA testing today is more likely to produce partial 
profiles from degraded samples, mixed profiles from multiple contributors, and profiles from 
touch DNA from assorted physical items found at or near the crime scene (which, as the name 
suggests, might contain miniscule amounts of DNA shed by a person who merely touched the 
item), all of which will have varying degrees of probative value.  No longer is DNA necessarily 
alone dispositive.”). 
50 See Scheck, Conviction Integrity Units Revisited, supra note 5, at 727 (writing in response 
to the Innocence Project recommendation to adopt an interests of justice mindset). 
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the Innocence Project argue that CIUs should adopt an “‘interests of 
justice” “orientation or mindset” when selecting cases to review.51  An 
interests of justice standard would allow for the discovery of wrongful 
convictions even in the absence of exculpatory forensic evidence or 
identification of the actual perpetrator.52  It can also allow for the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion to dismiss “in the interests of 
justice.” 
Prosecutors’ postconviction discretion to dismiss is guided by the 
postconviction legal standards as established through state 
legislative statutes, such as new evidence of innocence, actual 
innocence, or DNA testing statute.53  However, such standards are 
also subjective, reflecting prosecutorial and judicial discretion, as 
well as assessment about the defendant’s likely guilt or innocence.54  
In a study of nineteen conviction review units, the Quattrone Center 
for the Fair Administration of Justice further recommends that CIUs 
should vacate convictions in the interests of justice.55  The full 
recommendation reads, “Vacate each conviction where there is clear 
and convincing evidence of actual innocence, or where in the interests 
of justice, the CRU no longer believes that the current evidence 
supports the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.”56  These two 
standards, 1) clear and convincing evidence of actual innocence and 
2) the failure to support the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, 
represent two common approaches to assessing postconviction 
 
[S]ome prosecutors might be tempted to narrowly limit CIUs to review just cases of “actual 
innocence” (cases where it appears possible to prove unequivocally that someone other 
than the defendant committed the crime) or matters that involve only “newly discovered 
evidence of innocence” (evidence that a defense attorney could not have discovered with 
the exercise of due diligence).  It would be self-defeating and unfortunate to use such 
restrictive categories as initial cut-off mechanisms for a number of reasons. 
Id. 
51 See Conviction Integrity Unit Best Practices, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www
.innocenceproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Conviction-Integrity-Unit.pdf [https://
perma.cc/KXU9-SQP3] (listing a few standards of review that prosecutors might use including 
“Facts suggest plausible claim of innocence,” “Evidence of a constitutional violation,” or “Review 
is in the interests of justice”). 
52 Id. at 727–28. 
53 See John M. Leventhal, A Survey of Federal and State Courts’ Approaches to a 
Constitutional Right of Actual Innocence: Is There a Need for a State Constitutional Right in 
New York in the Aftermath of CPL § 440.10 (G-1)?, 76 ALB. L. REV. 1453, 1471-72 (2012) (“State 
laws allow a defendant to assert his actual innocence claim via post-conviction relief statutes 
based on newly discovered evidence and/or DNA evidence.”). 
54 See id. at 1472–73. 
55 See Hollway, supra note 5, at 3, 72. 
56 Id. at 3 (emphasis added). 
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evidence.57  Which standard to choose continues to be the subject of 
some debate,58 the distinction rests on affirmatively demonstrating 
innocence versus eliminating evidence of guilt.59 
According to ABA model rules for prosecutors’ postconviction 
behavior, “prosecutor[s] shall seek to remedy the conviction” 
whenever they discover “clear and convincing evidence” of 
innocence.60  The “clear and convincing” standard has also been 
adopted by twelve state legislatures as the benchmark for vacating 
convictions.61  However, some legal scholars have concluded that the 
standard is too high.62  Green and Yaroshefksy argue that the ABA 
standard should be interpreted as setting “a disciplinary floor, and 
thus presupposes that prosecutors will act even when the defendant’s 
innocence is less obvious than that.”63 
Indeed, most states’ statutes do not limit postconviction relief 
based on new evidence to only those cases that can provide “clear and 
convincing” new evidence of innocence.64  The most popular statutory 
regime provides a standard of “probably” or “more likely than not” 
the new evidence would produce a different result at retrial.65  In 
their survey of postconviction new evidence statutes, Brooks and 
colleagues argue that the popularity of this standard can be 
attributed to its ability to provide an achievable measure for innocent 
defendants to reach.66  The authors explain that new evidence of 
innocence may not so much provide proof of innocence as to 
 
57 See id. at 40. 
58 See id. 
59 See id. 
60 ABA Model Rule 3.8(h) “Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor” reads, “When a 
prosecutor knows of clear and convincing evidence establishing that a defendant in the 
prosecutor’s jurisdiction was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit, the 
prosecutor shall seek to remedy the conviction.”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(h) 
(AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
61 Justin Brooks et al., If Hindsight Is 20/20, Our Justice System Should Not Be Blind to 
New Evidence of Innocence: A Survey of Post-Conviction New Evidence Statutes and a Proposed 
Model, 79 ALB. L. REV. 1045, 1058, 1060–62 (2015) (listing thirteen states that have adopted 
the “clear and convincing evidence” standard and finding that the majority of states use 
“[p]robably” or “[m]ore [l]ikely [t]han [n]ot” a different result if the case was retried).  Since 
publication, an additional state has changed its standard. See Scheck, Conviction Integrity 
Units Revisited, supra note 5, at 733.) 
62 Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Discretion and Post-Conviction 
Evidence of Innocence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 467, 508 (2009); Brooks et al., supra note 61, at 
1062. 
63 Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 62, at 508; see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
r. 3.8(h). 
64 See Brooks et al., supra note 61, at 1056, 1058, 1060. 
65 See id. at 1058, 1060. 
66 See id. at 1045, 1060 (“[T]his standard is not so high that innocent individuals are forced 
to establish their innocence to an unachievable degree.”). 
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completely eliminate all evidence of guilt.67  A variety of situations 
are implicated, for example: when key prosecution witnesses have 
recanted, a police officer or forensic analyst who testified is 
discredited in a different case, or new scientific understanding 
undermines the forensic evidence at trial.  Even exculpatory DNA 
testing results may fail to produce clear and convincing evidence of 
innocence in some cases.68  Depending on the centrality of the flawed 
evidence to the conviction, these developments may so weaken the 
prosecution’s case that the jury (if they had known) would probably 
not have returned a guilty verdict.  Yet, courts may not interpret 
these forms of new evidence as providing “clear and convincing 
evidence of actual innocence.” 
Adopting an interests of justice mindset allows for review and the 
possibility of relief in a wider variety of cases.  Prosecutors adopting 
this mindset acknowledge the shifting postconviction landscape that 
calls for greater accountability for discredited police officers,69 a new 
awareness of the limitations of forensic techniques that were once 
relied upon,70 and the limitations of postconviction DNA testing to 
provide conclusive proof of innocence in some cases.71  Some states 
are beginning to adapt postconviction relief statutes in response to 
the recognition that flawed forensic analysis and testimony have 
 
67 See id. at 1062 (discussing the clear and convincing standard for evidence of innocence).  
“Requiring affirmative evidence of innocence prohibits courts from granting new trials in cases 
where the newly discovered evidence has completely eliminated all evidence of guilt.”  Id. 
68 Brooks and colleagues write, 
For example, in many rape cases, where DNA testing later shows that sperm found in the 
victim did not come from the man convicted of the crime, prosecutors will argue that the 
DNA must have come from a consensual lover, or from another perpetrator committing 
the crime with the defendant—even when the theory at trial was that there was only one 
attacker.  Under the “clear and convincing evidence of innocence” standard, however, such 
a scenario may well prevent courts from concluding the conviction should be reversed. 
Id. at 1063 (emphasis added). 
69 See Sklansky, Progressive Prosecutor’s Handbook, supra note 23, at 25, 38. 
70 See Findley, supra note 13, at 185; Imwinkelried, supra note 14, at 1120; Aviva Orenstein, 
Debunked, Discredited, but Still Defended: Why Prosecutors Resist Challenges to Bad Science 
and Some Suggestions for Crafting Remedies for Wrongful Conviction Based on Changed 
Science, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1139, 1142 (2018). 
71 See Findley, supra note 13, at 186. 
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contributed to wrongful convictions.72  However, prosecutors may 
resist agreeing to relief in these cases based on an insistence in the 
defendant’s guilt and/or the specter of “a tidal wave of new trial 
motions” in response.73  In addition, prosecutors evaluating 
postconviction innocence claims based on their ability to identify the 
actual perpetrator may be discouraged by claims featuring shaken 
baby syndrome or arson, in which no crime may have been committed 
at all and therefore, no perpetrator exists.74 
Whether prosecutors adopt an interests of justice mindset or look 
for clear and convincing evidence of innocence determines all other 
case selection and dismissal decisions.  Therefore, in the following 
description of the prosecutor interviews, I begin by reporting 
prosecutor respondents’ statements about postconviction standards.  
Prosecutors differed in several respects: their standards for 
dismissing cases, their willingness to explore non-forensic 
postconviction new evidence of innocence, their framework for 
agreeing to postconviction DNA testing, their approach to conducting 
reinvestigations, and their approach to new forensic developments 
beyond DNA. 
Through this exercise, I do not attempt to distinguish certain 
prosecutor respondents as progressive and others as traditional.  
Some expressed progressive viewpoints on some issues and more 
traditional viewpoints on others.  Moreover, external factors such as 
state laws and rules regarding postconviction practice influence 
prosecutors’ decision making, as well they should.  Instead, I intend 
to develop a portrait of progressive prosecution in the postconviction 
stage by highlighting these differences and exploring what they 
might mean for prosecutors’ responses to innocence claims in the 
future. 
 
72 See Imwinkelried, supra note 14, at 1101–01 (discussing statutory changes in Texas and 
California). 
If a prior conviction rested on expert testimony, has the later research raised such grave 
questions about the reliability of the testimony that the accused should receive a new 
trial?  This question has become so pressing that several jurisdictions have recently 
amended their post-conviction relief statutes to address the question. 
Id. 
73 Orenstein, supra note 70, at 1151–52 (“The use of a flawed science technique might have 
affected many cases and a tidal wave of new trial motions would overwhelm the system, 
particularly because old cases would be difficult to retry years later, given stale evidence and 
long-gone witnesses.  Finally, in some cases the bad science, while wrong and unfair, does not 
necessarily shake the court’s belief in actual guilt.”). 
74 See Findley, supra note 13, at 187. 
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III. PROSECUTORS’ RESPONSES TO NEW EVIDENCE 
OF INNOCENCE 
A. Standards of Review and Dismissal 
In reporting the results from these interviews, I explore issues that 
the prosecutors themselves raised as salient when assessing new 
evidence of innocence.  Recall that prosecutor respondents have all 
assisted with an exoneration case in which the prosecution moved to 
dismiss the conviction (or joined in a defense motion to dismiss).  
According to the NRE definition of exoneration, some evidence of 
innocence must contribute.75  Therefore, the cases described by 
prosecutors for this study present more than just constitutional 
claims of procedural error.  While prosecutor respondents rarely 
discussed legal standards directly (e.g., “clear and convincing new 
evidence” or “reasonable doubt”) they did describe how their office 
framed the decision to dismiss.  Relatedly, they volunteered their 
assessments of the defendant’s innocence and guilt.  These remarks 
were notable for how prosecutors varied in the degree to which they 
accepted ambiguity about the defendant’s guilt or innocence. 
Five prosecutors, whether for statutory or discretionary reasons, 
sought to conclusively prove innocence.  The exoneration cases they 
assisted with all included exculpatory DNA testing results and/or 
identification of the real perpetrator.  For example, Prosecutor 19 
distinguished between “That evidence wasn’t enough to convict me 
beyond a reasonable doubt,” and, “Here’s evidence that somebody 
other than me did it.”  Prosecutor 19 suggested that his assessment 
of innocence would rest on discovering the identity of the real 
perpetrator. 
Several prosecutors who described aiming for this higher standard 
expressed feeling constrained by it.  Prosecutors’ recommendations 
for postconviction relief are guided by the standards as established 
through state statute and by state courts.76  In the words of CIU 
Prosecutor 5, “For us, since the [court] ultimately has to approve it, 
you need to always be mindful of ‘can you get to that burden of proof?’”  
Prosecutor 20 contrasted the vast discretion that prosecutors in his 
 
75 See Glossary, supra note 17. 
76 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473(b) (Deering 2017); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 
11.073(b) (West 2015); In re Hall, 673 P.2d 690, 696 (Cal. 1981) (citing In re Branch, 449 P.2d 
174, 18384 (Cal. 1969)); Ex parte White, 506 S.W.3d 39, 44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing Ex 
parte Harleston, 431 S.W.3d 67, 70 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)). 
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state enjoy pretrial with the constraints imposed by post-trial 
standards, saying “our leverage is significantly reduced.” 
In contrast, several other prosecutors’ comments demonstrated 
their much greater postconviction discretion.  For example, “If we 
want to get rid of a case, we can get rid of a case even after somebody’s 
been convicted,”77 and, “We can dismiss just because . . . we don’t 
have to articulate a reason.”78  Four prosecutors specifically described 
assessing whether they could retry the case, thus applying a 
standard that resembles the same one used in charging decisions: 
“I felt that there was insufficient proof for him to be 
prosecuted.”79 
“What we determined from our investigation is I don’t have 
the evidence to go forward with a prosecution today.”80 
“We just didn’t have evidence to charge him, much less 
convict him.”81 
“[W]ithout anything else to go on, there simply wasn’t 
enough.”82 
The assessment that prosecutors made in these cases evaluates 
whether they would have charged the case in the first place if they 
had all the facts and the benefit of the new evidence.  In these 
examples, the assessment corresponds to an interests of justice 
mindset.83  The decision rests more on existing evidence of guilt 
rather than affirmative evidence of innocence. 
Among the fifteen prosecutors who responded to questions about a 
specific exoneration case that they had dismissed, four made a point 
to say that they were not convinced of the defendant’s innocence.  
Prosecutor 22’s response is representative: “I wasn’t saying that the 
defendant was innocent, I just didn’t feel comfortable saying he was 
guilty.”  In these examples, prosecutors demonstrated that they felt 
compelled to dismiss a case despite ambiguity about the question of 
guilt or innocence.  These prosecutors’ comments also reflected the 
available evidence used to make the legal determination.  These were 
not shallow personal assessments—those unshakeable gut feelings 
 
77 CIU Prosecutor 29. 
78 CIU Prosecutor 27. 
79 Prosecutor 18. 
80 Prosecutor 23. 
81 CIU Prosecutor 16. 
82 Prosecutor 32. 
83 See, e.g., Hollway, supra note 5, at 10; Scheck, Conviction Integrity Units Revisited, supra 
note 5, at 727. 
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about a case that might reveal deeper cognitive biases.  Rather, they 
were affirmations that the decision to dismiss had been the right 
thing to do in spite of the grey areas surrounding the question of 
actual innocence.84 
B. Evidentiary Criteria Used to Evaluate Innocence Claims 
Prosecutors were asked what criteria they used to evaluate 
innocence claims in general and how they chose to become involved 
in a specific exoneration case.  Eight prosecutors, all working out of 
CIUs, expressed broad flexibility in what they might review, for 
example: “A litany of things you could look into,”85 “Factual issues 
that we didn’t appreciate at the time,”86 and, “There’s no specific 
formula . . . it could come in many different forms.”87 
In contrast, five prosecutors spoke mainly of assessing whether 
innocence claims could be subjected to some type of forensic testing.88  
These prosecutors sought evidence that would have a “forensic 
angle”89 or that could provide “something you can test.”90  The 
different types of responses suggest a difference in approach between 
considering new evidence that challenges the underlying conviction 
and requiring new evidence that conclusively establishes innocence.  
Prosecutors varied in their expressed willingness to review the 
former as well as the latter. 
While all prosecutors required some new evidence of innocence in 
order to proceed with an innocence claim, some were more willing to 
consider non-forensic evidence—for example new or recanting 
witnesses—than others.  CIU Prosecutor 33, who helped exonerate a 
defendant based on new witness testimony, asserted the need for 
prosecutors to continue “to move forward even though there may not 
be a forensics angle.”  She added, “That’s something that I think is 
going to be an area that develops over the years.” 
 
84 These prosecutors should not be confused with “the innocence deniers” who “delay justice 
and in some cases actively work against it.”  Lara Bazelon, The Innocence Deniers, Slate (Jan. 
10, 2018), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/01/innocence-deniers-prosecutors-who-
have-refused-to-admit-wrongful-convictions.html [https://perma.cc/A2YW-UW9H].  Prosecutor 
respondents proactively dismissed the conviction rather than acquiescing after unsuccessful 
litigation.  An innocence-denying prosecutor is one who continues to assert the exonerated 
defendant’s guilt.  Rather, these prosecutor respondents declined to assert his/her innocence. 
85 CIU Prosecutor 5. 
86 CIU Prosecutor 16. 
87 CIU Prosecutor 26. 
88 Of the remaining seven prosecutor respondents, five expressed a preference for forensic 
evidence, but not a requirement for it, and two could not be categorized based on their answers. 
89 CIU Prosecutor 6. 
90 Prosecutor 9. 
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Likewise, CIU Prosecutor 35 anticipated the decline of 
postconviction DNA requests in the future and spoke of his interest 
in reviewing claims involving discredited actors and procedures: 
When we look, if we see a name that we’re concerned about, if 
we see, certainly, a procedure that we’re concerned about . . . .  
Now, that doesn’t alone mean that every one of those cases is 
a wrongful conviction, but that has to be something that we 
look at.  The same with the people involved.  It’s sort of tough 
because there’s no black and white here.  That’s why the DNA 
category of cases I think is, for a lot of reasons those are some 
of the easier ones for us from a judgment perspective.  I think 
as we do more and more testing and move more and more into 
the future, hopefully at least, I don’t think we’re going to see 
as many of those cases.  Then it’s going to come down to more 
of a judgment call. 
CIU Prosecutor 35 opens the door to reviewing claims that may not 
yield conclusive proof of innocence.  He acknowledges that such cases 
are not “black and white” but also suggests willingness, and a sense 
of obligation, to make those judgment calls. 
At its most dispositive, postconviction DNA testing cases are the 
“easier ones,” as CIU Prosecutor 35 attests.  DNA can conclusively 
establish innocence and even identify the actual perpetrator.91  In 
contrast, non-forensic evidence, and particularly recantation 
evidence can be “difficult,”92 “tricky,”93 or “grey.”94  For example, 
Prosecutor 34 explained, “If there were to be DNA in a case, 
something like that would certainly be compelling.  I’m very skeptical 
of recantation testimony, so it doesn’t weigh a whole lot on my mind.”  
Like Prosecutor 34, four other prosecutors juxtaposed new forensic 
evidence—particularly DNA—against new witness and recantation 
evidence.  On a scale of the probative value of this new evidence, 
prosecutors’ comments suggested a ranking with DNA evidence at 
the top and recantation evidence at the bottom.  Recantation evidence 
was deemed less compelling and more subjective when compared to 
dispositive forensic evidence.  For prosecutors reviewing innocence 
claims, these two forms of new evidence represented different 
polarities of evidentiary reliability.  Prosecutor 18 explained that the 
 
91 See Gould & Leo, supra note 26, at 336–37. 
92 CIU Prosecutor 37. 
93 Prosecutor 18. 
94 CIU Prosecutor 16. 
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types of postconviction innocence claims he receives most regularly 
are DNA requests and recantations: 
Like I say, most of these center around DNA.  Obviously, the 
other area, which has always been around, because people 
years later will come forward and say, “Oh I didn’t tell the 
truth.  Here’s what really happened,” and they’ll try to re-open 
up cases in that fashion.  Those are really hard claims.  So 
they’ve gone to court under oath and said X, Y and Z and then 
later they’ve come back to say, “Well that really wasn’t really 
true.”  Gauging the veracity of people coming forward in those 
circumstances and their motivation just is tricky. 
This prosecutor explained how recantation evidence is both 
common and frequently unreliable.  He established DNA as the high-
water mark from which recantation evidence fell short.  These 
recantation cases may be “tricky” because they are less probative, but 
also because they can require more legwork to reinvestigate than 
DNA cases. 
Furthermore, recantations were doubted by several prosecutors 
who expressed concerns that witnesses could be bullied into 
recanting.  Prosecutor 23, who explained that affidavits based on 
recanting testimony are commonplace in his jurisdiction, feared that 
crediting this type of evidence may unwittingly encourage witness 
harassment. 
I know for instance for affidavits of recanting testimony, that 
kind of stuff is usually non-starters.  Because we all know, and 
you don’t want to put in place, parameters that can allow 
victims of a crime to forever be harassed, threatened, 
intimidated by family members or associates of the 
incarcerated once the trial is finalized. 
This prosecutor stressed the importance of finality in the trial and 
raised the possibility that exploring recantation evidence could start 
a precedent that might harm crime victims.  His concerns were 
echoed by a CIU prosecutor who had himself assisted with an 
exoneration based largely on recantation evidence.  Despite 
acknowledging the risks, the CIU prosecutor also recognized that 
recantations could be credible in certain situations, saying, “We’re 
going to really want to probe that to figure out when they were telling 
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the truth.”95  Therefore, while both prosecutors recognized the risks 
of recantation evidence, they differed in their willingness to explore 
it.  Is recantation evidence a “non-starter”?  Or is it something 
prosecutors might “really want to probe”? 
C. Reinvestigating and Testing Innocence Claims 
Five prosecutors described interviewing witnesses as the focal 
point of an active reinvestigation in cases otherwise lacking any 
forensic evidence.  CIU Prosecutor 33 described her reinvestigation 
as a “subjective” process, requiring the unit to conduct interviews 
with new witnesses and then also seek corroboration for what the 
witnesses had shared.  As she argued, this process of investigating 
non-forensic evidence is “exactly what a conviction integrity program 
should doing.”  She compared this process to a “flow chart” in which 
each new piece of information continues to lead the investigator 
forward in new directions.  As the reinvestigation continues, the 
process involves “weighing the new pieces of evidence versus the old 
pieces of evidence” and asking, “Are we starting to detract from the 
evidence that we had?”  Prosecutor 27 describes her CIU’s process of 
reinvestigation in strikingly similar terms: 
Most of the time, we don’t have a smoking gun of exculpatory 
evidence.  I don’t have an alibi saying he wasn’t here.  I don’t 
have a video of him somewhere else . . . . What you really have 
most of the time is our picking away at the case that convicted 
the person.  That’s almost always what you have, is a chipping 
away at that, instead of the opposite.  It’s very rare that you 
have the smoking gun of exculpatory evidence. 
These two CIU prosecutors described a process of evaluating the 
strength of existing evidence as much as identifying new exculpatory 
evidence.  In other words, they were aware that the reinvestigation 
may not establish conclusive proof of innocence yet open to the 
possibility that it might weaken the state’s case to the point that the 
prosecution would agree to dismiss.  In this type of reinvestigation, 
the prosecution plays an active role. 
Two other prosecutors’ comments suggested that they would 
respond to recantation statements by sending police out to interview 
witnesses.  As Prosecutor 17 stated, his office “would conditionally 
 
95 CIU Prosecutor 16. 
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look into it.”  Both Prosecutor 17 and Prosecutor 21 reported that 
prosecutors would not investigate new recantation evidence 
themselves.  Rather, as Prosecutor 21 explained, 
We send police out to interview the person, investigate the 
scene and what they’re saying, re-look at certain things . . . .  
They’re more familiar with the area than we were . . . .  More 
familiar with people in the neighborhood maybe more familiar 
with the witnesses that are now saying that they saw 
something, or now recanting, change of idea, those kind of 
things.  Sometimes they’re just in a better position to deal 
with it than anybody else you could send. 
The practice of relying on police to reinvestigate saves prosecutors 
time and allows them to close the case faster.  However, the police’s 
prior knowledge of the crime and the individuals involved can also 
bias them against new witnesses’ statements.96  In such 
reinvestigations, there is also the risk that police will aggressively 
question new witnesses or threaten trial witnesses with perjury if 
they recant.97  I include discussion of this practice in order to 
distinguish prosecutors’ active reinvestigation from this more passive 
process of sending police officers out to interview witnesses.  An 
alternative to personally following up on every new postconviction 
lead would be to send investigators employed by the prosecutors’ 
office instead of asking police who may have been involved in the 
original investigation and at least one prosecutor spoke of doing so. 
Five prosecutors focused on subjecting innocence claims to some 
type of forensic testing.  In the clearest cut cases, these more 
“objective”98 measures can provide a “smoking gun” of innocence that 
leads unerringly to exoneration.99  Therefore, some prosecutors 
 
96 See Laurie L. Levenson, Searching for Injustice: The Challenge of Postconviction 
Discovery, Investigation, and Litigation, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 545, 561, 574, 578–79 (2014). 
97 See id. at 561 (“Detectives can take very aggressive approaches when conducting their 
postconviction interviews of trial and potential trial witnesses.  It is not uncommon for 
prosecution investigators to remind trial witnesses of the testimony they gave at trial and to 
subtly or not so subtly threaten them with perjury if they recant at the postconviction stage.  
Investigators also may mislead witnesses as to the purpose of their postconviction inquiries, 
leading them to believe that persons challenging a conviction have malicious motives in seeking 
a rehearing.”). 
98 Prosecutor 23: “And again, this case is different than a lot, in that most of these innocence 
claims now are more of subjective information that we’re talking about as opposed to objective.” 
99 See Jennifer E. Lauren, Remapping the Path Forward: Toward a Systemic View of 
Forensic Science Reform and Oversight, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1051, 1054 (2013); see, e.g., Gould & 
Leo, supra note 26, at 336–37. 
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focused on forensic evidence, including DNA as the obvious 
preference, but also palm prints, fingerprints, and even polygraph 
evidence.  These prosecutors’ postconviction efforts centered on 
finding “something you can test.”100  If the results of the forensic 
analysis prove exculpatory, prosecutors have a better chance of 
reaching the clear and convincing standard.101  However, an 
overreliance on having something to test, even when convictions do 
not involve forensic evidence, may also result in reliance on outdated 
methods. 
Although the admissibility of polygraph evidence varies by 
jurisdiction and seeking its admission is discouraged,102 four 
prosecutor respondents mentioned using or wanting to use 
polygraphs to test the veracity of a defendant or alternate suspect.  
In the words of Prosecutor 20, “I routinely suggest polygraphs.”  
Speaking of defense attorney reservations, he added, “Not everyone 
is willing to submit a defendant to a polygraph.  But I’m always 
interested.”  Prosecutor 9 explained that if a defendant passed the 
polygraph, he would invite them to file a motion for a new trial; 
however, he said that most of the time defendants did not want to 
take the polygraph, or else they took it and failed.  CIU Prosecutor 6 
suggested that she would like to submit a defendant to a polygraph 
to corroborate recantation evidence. 
While most prosecutor respondents simply did not mention 
polygraphs, one CIU Prosecutor explicitly rejected them.  His 
remarks highlight the limitations of polygraph testing as a tool of 
postconviction reinvestigation: 
We don’t ask people to take them, we don’t rely upon them, 
and I think they’re kind of bullshit.  So the fact that somebody 
passed one doesn’t mean anything to me, and that they failed 
 
100 Prosecutor 9: “I think how I would try and do it, is you look and see what was the 
evidence?  Was it thin and is there a possibility that the guy may not be guilty of what he’s in 
jail for, and if so, if there’s something you can test that will answer that question.” 
101 See Yaroshefsky, supra note 42, at 354; Gould & Leo, supra note 26, at 336–37. 
102 See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 312 (1998) (“Individual jurisdictions 
therefore may reasonably reach differing conclusions as to whether polygraph evidence should 
be admitted.”); Jon N. Banashek & J. Keith Collins, Polygraph Examinations: Admissibility 
and Privilege Issues, 31 COLO. LAW. 69, 69 (2002); Stephanie M. Williams, Evidence-Polygraph 
Test Results Inadmissible at Criminal Trials, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 279, 279 (1990); U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, Polygraphs—Department Policy, JUST. MANUAL § 9-13.300 (Jan. 2020), https://
www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-13000-obtaining-evidence#9-13.300 [https://perma.cc/F5UH-QLFY] 
(“The Department [of Justice] opposes all attempts by defense counsel to admit polygraph 
evidence or to have an examiner appointed by the court to conduct a polygraph test.  
Government attorneys should refrain from seeking the admission of favorable examinations 
that may have been conducted during the investigatory stage . . . .”). 
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one doesn’t mean a lot, either . . . . Like, if somebody said, 
“Hey, look, I took a polygraph, I passed it, therefore I’m not 
guilty,” we would never consider that valid.  But we also don’t 
consider it the other way.  We wouldn’t say, “You failed it, 
therefore it’s guilty.”103 
Instead of relying upon polygraph evidence, CIU Prosecutor 16 
described repeated interviews with a recanting victim witness as well 
as further reinvestigation.  Ultimately, the CIU came to the 
conclusion that the recantation was valid, and the case was dismissed 
without the benefit of forensic evidence. 
D. Responding to Requests for Postconviction DNA Testing 
Fourteen prosecutors reported receiving postconviction DNA 
testing requests, and of those, six described fighting or denying these 
requests in certain circumstances.  These six prosecutors believed 
that defense attorneys requested postconviction DNA testing in cases 
that were unlikely to yield dispositive results.  Recall that as DNA 
testing becomes more sensitive, it will also become less dispositive in 
certain applications.104  A couple of prosecutors defaulted to agreeing 
to DNA testing anyway, while others indicated that they would 
oppose these requests.  For example, Prosecutor 6 related the 
experience of having postconviction DNA testing conducted on a 
murder victim’s panties even though there was no indication that the 
crime was sexual in nature or that the perpetrator had touched the 
panties.  As she explained: “I know that the recommendation is just 
to agree to everything, but I’ll tell you my experience with that.  My 
experience with that is now having to go to court and explain why it 
doesn’t matter.” 
Other prosecutors reported receiving “random requests” for DNA 
testing,105 questioned whether “peripheral things” should be 
subjected to DNA testing,106 and expressed concerns that DNA 
testing results would be used as a “wedge issue” for retrial.107  As 
Prosecutor 9 asked, “Are we going to test every cigarette butt found 
at the crime scene?”  Prosecutors further cautioned that speculative 
 
103 CIU Prosecutor 16. 
104 See Findley, supra note 13, at 186. 
105 Prosecutor 21. 
106 Prosecutor 18. 
107 Prosecutor 17. 
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DNA testing could be used to falsely implicate an alternative 
suspect.108 
The willingness of four prosecutors to agree to speculative DNA 
testing provides a counter perspective.  CIU Prosecutor 27 explained, 
“It’s not necessarily that DNA or testing is going to lead to the real 
killer or exculpatory/inculpatory evidence; it’s more it’s just a tool or 
resource to continue the investigation.”  As DNA technology 
advances, postconviction DNA testing may be employed not just as a 
smoking gun to prove innocence but also as an additional tool of 
reinvestigation.109  For an example of how DNA testing might be used 
as a “resource to continue the investigation,” CIU Prosecutor 33 
described how her CIU investigated DNA testing results by 
interviewing DNA forensic experts and victim’s family members to 
gain a clearer understanding of the exculpatory value of the results.  
Therefore, some prosecutors expressed willingness to probe the 
dispositive nature of DNA after results were conducted and could be 
reinvestigated further. 
In response to Prosecutor 9’s rhetorical question about testing 
every cigarette butt found at the crime scene, CIU Prosecutor 27 
answered that yes, “we do that.”  She acknowledged that “we do some 
ridiculous testing,” but explained that the DNA may lead to a new 
witness in the case, if not to an alternative suspect. 
E. Reviewing Flawed Forensic Cases 
Five CIU prosecutors also spoke of reviewing old cases involving 
faulty forensic testimony and/or outdated or discredited forensic 
methods, including bite mark analysis, DNA mixture interpretation, 
toxicology reports, hair microscopy and more.110  These prosecutors 
described doing the work in a systematic way.  Prosecutors outside 
the context of CIUs did not mention these types of large-scale forensic 
reviews and indeed, they may not have had the resources to devote 
to them. 
 
108 CIU Prosecutor 27 related the experience of having a CODIS hit identify an individual 
that would have been only five years old at the time of the crime.  She sighed, “They aren’t the 
real killer . . . because they were in kindergarten.” 
109 See Yaroshefsky, supra note 42, at 354; Gould & Leo, supra note 26, at 336–37. 
110 See, e.g., Zurizadai Balmakund, The Realities of Neurolaw: A Composition of Data & 
Research, 9 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 189, 204 (2015); M. Chris Fabricant & Tucker 
Carrington, The Shifted Paradigm: Forensic Science’s Overdue Evolution from Magic to Law, 4 
VA. J. CRIM. L. 1, 91 (2016); Lauren McLane, Confronting the Twenty-First-Century Marian 
Examination, 82 ALB. L. REV. 949, 973 (2019); Mark Page et al., Expert Interpretation of 
Bitemark Injuries—A Contemporary Qualitative Study, 58 J. FORENSIC SCI. 664, 671 (2013). 
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Nevertheless, one non-CIU prosecutor stands out for having 
conducted an extensive non-DNA forensic reinvestigation in light of 
new scientific developments that challenged the original forensic 
interpretation in the case.  In this reinvestigation, which ultimately 
led to dismissal, Prosecutor 23’s experience is instructive.  He 
discussed how he initially struggled to find a neutral, independent 
expert to review the evidence for the case, not the lab who had 
originally analyzed the case and not a defense expert either.  He 
ultimately identified a “well-regarded expert in a private lab” who 
was “a huge help in educating us” about the forensic science and how 
it had changed over the years.  When asked for his advice for other 
prosecutors, Prosecutor 23 responded, 
Now there’s always going to be advances in technology and 
science in which we look back . . . [because] we know that 
what they thought was accurate at the time was not.  And I 
assume that’s going to continue to happen throughout history 
as we advance, right?  But the advice is just to look at it 
yourself.  And continue to advocate for reform that allows us 
to get it right the first time. 
Prosecutor 23 framed technological and scientific advancements as 
an ongoing, natural progression.  Rather than identifying some 
historical moment (e.g., the discovery of DNA), as the end point of 
progress, he expressed the ongoing need to learn from new scientific 
developments and to apply them to prosecutorial decision making.  
He described needing to become a “quasi-expert” in the science in 
order to be able to make an informed decision about the case. 
In contrast, Prosecutor 19 described a case involving updated 
interpretation of forensic evidence in an arson case as an example of 
an innocence claim that was denied by his office.  As he explained, “It 
was our position that they didn’t have a sufficient foundation or 
basis.”  He questioned whether a new fire examiner could make an 
evaluation based on old photographs of the crime scene.  This stance 
could mean categorically rejecting arson cases for review since the 
charred remains of the scene are not likely to have been preserved 
years later.  Instead, fire examiners conduct controlled experiments 
and study actual fires to determine if the so-called “arson indicators” 
used as evidence in past convictions can also occur in accidental 
fires.111  Recall also that Prosecutor 19 suggested a higher standard 
 
111 Findley, supra note 13, at 200. 
83 ALB. L. REV. 989 
2019/2020] Postconviction Innocence Review 1015 
for innocence review, one that relied upon identification of the real 
perpetrator to result in an exoneration.  In a wrongful arson 
conviction, there would be no real perpetrator if the fire was 
accidental. 
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This qualitative research study develops an emerging portrait of 
progressive prosecution in the postconviction stage.  It reveals some 
of the challenges that prosecutors will face in the years to come as 
they work to fulfill their commitment to correcting wrongful 
convictions.  Prosecutor interviewees were willing to not only assist 
with an exoneration case, but also to be interviewed at length about 
it. Therefore, they represent the vanguard of postconviction 
innocence review.  Yet there is still variation in their approaches and 
points of disagreement and tension in making difficult postconviction 
decisions. 
The most influential decision concerned the standards of review 
and dismissal for innocence claims, which also determined the types 
of new evidence that would be considered worthy of pursuing.  
Generally, prosecutor respondents preferred DNA testing, or at least 
some type of forensic testing, over sources of non-forensic evidence 
such as recantations and new witnesses.  The disagreements arose 
over whether and how prosecutors would also pursue grey-area cases.  
This comparison between black-and-white cases and grey-area cases 
was a recurrent theme.  Some prosecutors juxtaposed postconviction 
DNA evidence with recantation evidence.  Their concern that 
recantations are likely to be unreliable, or worse, a result of witnesses 
being coerced or threatened into changing their testimony is justified.  
Nevertheless, recantation evidence has contributed to hundreds of 
exonerations,112 including several assisted by prosecutor 
interviewees in this study.  This question of how to respond to 
recantation evidence should become increasingly relevant for 
prosecutors in light of mounting evidence that perjury or false 
accusations is the greatest contributing factor of known wrongful 
convictions.113 
 
112 See Warden, supra note 15, at 106 (finding that 383 of the first 1,319 cases in the 
National Registry of Exonerations database involved post-conviction recantations by 
prosecution witnesses). 
113 See GROSS & GROSS, supra note 15, at 8; Warden, supra note 15, at 106 (“One lesson of 
the DNA forensic age is that recantations of trial testimony by prosecution witnesses deserve 
to be taken seriously, notwithstanding time-honored dicta to the contrary.”). 
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Prosecutor respondents also expressed concerns about frivolous 
requests for DNA testing.  Some described fielding “random” requests 
for DNA testing that they believed would not yield dispositive results.  
Agreeing to test everything, as a rule, could be expensive and 
impractical.114  Defense attorneys, and petitioners themselves, might 
request DNA testing irrationally—even when it is not in their own 
best interest.  However, prosecutors’ assumptions about the 
materiality of such testing might also color their responses.115  For 
example, some prosecutor respondents regularly conducted DNA 
testing as part of a larger reinvestigation, while others questioned 
the value of testing certain items (cigarette butts, beer bottles) that 
they assumed to be immaterial to the crime.116  To help resolve these 
issues, prosecutors could consult with forensic experts before 
agreeing to testing in some cases to better assess its probative 
value,117 and/or to better understand the DNA results after testing 
has been conducted.  District attorneys’ offices might also develop 
policies regarding testing and evaluating postconviction forensic 
evidence: when to agree to DNA testing, when to consult forensic 
experts, and when to review cases featuring new scientific 
developments. 
Prosecutor respondents also disagreed about how to handle 
innocence claims involving new forensic evidence, such as when 
forensic testimony in discredited disciplines is subject to review.  In 
some of these cases, particularly convictions based on shaken baby 
syndrome and arson, the forensic evidence is paramount to the 
question of innocence.118  Therefore, deconstructing the forensic 
evidence of guilt completely undermines the conviction—but it 
doesn’t necessarily provide affirmative evidence of innocence.  
Referring to these types of cases, Keith Findley writes: “[T]he next 
 
114 See Samuel R. Wiseman, Waiving Innocence, 96 MINN. L. REV. 952, 1013 (2012). 
115 See Jenia I. Turner & Allison D. Redlich, Two Models of Pre-Plea Discovery in Criminal 
Cases: An Empirical Comparison, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 285, 341 (2016). 
116 See, e.g., Michael Morton, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu
/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3834 [https://perma.cc/YA2M-EDV8].  A 
classic example of this is the case of Michael Morton who was eventually exonerated when DNA 
testing was conducted on a bloody bandana found 100 yards from the crime scene.  After five 
years of the prosecutors opposing this testing, a Texas court ordered it.  The bandana had been 
dropped by the perpetrator, Mark Norwood, and contained the blood of the victim on it.  Morton 
was exonerated in 2011.  See id. 
117 See Hollway, supra note 5, at 56.  The Quattrone Center report mentions this practice of 
one CRU participating in their study: “[A]t least one CRU has a process in place that allows its 
investigators to discuss the benefits of various tests with an independent (i.e., external) forensic 
expert.  If the expert suggests that testing would be valuable, then the CRU approves the test.”  
Id. 
118 See Findley, supra note 13, at 189. 
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generation of innocence cases should embrace a broader definition of 
innocence, one that recognizes innocence where the bases for 
prosecution have been undermined, but ground truth is 
fundamentally ambiguous or inaccessible.”119  Just as prosecutors 
once denied requests for postconviction DNA testing, they may now 
resist innocence claims that challenge outdated forensic methods.120  
On the other hand, one prosecutor respondent in this sample spoke 
of assisting in just such a case.  Instrumental to his process was 
locating a neutral expert to review the evidence.  Based on his 
example, prosecutors and defense attorneys might anticipate 
coordinating a cooperative effort to locate a shared, external forensic 
expert. 
At the same time, some prosecutor respondents searched too 
broadly for “something to test,” perhaps as an unanticipated 
byproduct of the DNA revolution.121  Prosecutors inclined to evaluate 
innocence through forensic methods push for testing of even non-
forensic evidence—such as recantations or a defendant’s assertion of 
their innocence—through the use of polygraphs.  Polygraph evidence 
continues to be inadmissible in most courts.122  If prosecutors want to 
be considered progressive, they should not rely on outdated methods. 
Finally, reviewing a broader variety of claims and agreeing to relief 
in cases that fall short of the “clear and convincing evidence of 
innocence” threshold may result in prosecutors expressing less 
confidence in the exonerated defendant’s innocence.  To this point, 
only two prosecutor respondents asserted their personal belief in the 
defendant’s innocence.  At first glance, this is somewhat remarkable 
from a sample of prosecutors who assisted with exoneration cases.  
Prosecutors who profess the exonerated defendant’s innocence to the 
press or, even better, to the governor’s office, provide defendants with 
a great advantage post-exoneration.123  Yet, the prosecutors’ position 
on actual innocence will necessarily reflect the strength of the 
exculpatory evidence leading to the dismissal.  Whether a prosecutor 
 
119 Id. at 187 (referring to cases featuring new scientific developments, specifically shaken 
baby syndrome and arson convictions). 
120 See Orenstein, supra note 70, at 1158 (“The institutional resistance exhibited by some 
prosecutors and judges in the DNA exonerations, where even clear-cut evidence of wrongful 
conviction was denied or explained away, predicts how many of these actors will respond to 
challenges based on changed science in the fields of bite marks, microscopic hair analysis, and 
other areas where the science has developed to discredit previous expert testimony.”). 
121 See Erin Murphy, A Tale of Two Sciences, 110 MICH. L. REV. 909, 909 (2012). 
122 See Adam B. Shniderman, You Can’t Handle the Truth: Lies, Damn Lies, and the 
Exclusion of Polygraph Evidence, 22 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 433, 442 (2012). 
123 See Elizabeth S. Vartkessian & Jared P. Tyler, Legal and Social Exoneration: The 
Consequences of Michael Toney’s Wrongful Conviction, 75 ALB. L. REV. 1467, 1485, 1488 (2012). 
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quietly dismisses a case in the interests of justice (due to a lack of 
any remaining evidence of guilt) or publicly recommends exoneration 
and declares the defendant’s innocence, can have more to do with the 
case than with the prosecutor.  The latter scenario differs mainly in 
its degree of newsworthiness.  To say this does not absolve 
prosecutors of ever acknowledging the actual innocence of the 
defendants who meet that higher standard of clear and convincing 
evidence. 
One strategy for prosecutors who resist postconviction innocence 
review has been to offer the defendant a postconviction plea bargain, 
often in the form of an Alford Plea,124 which allows defendants to 
maintain innocence while pleading guilty.125  Such dispositions may 
allow prosecutors to hold on to a conviction even when the available 
evidence might not support it. 
Prosecutors may not resort to such tactics if state statutes better 
supported their ability to provide relief.  A dozen states still require 
defendants to meet a clear and convincing standard in order to 
receive postconviction relief under new evidence of innocence 
statutes.126  Indeed, some prosecutor respondents expressed feeling 
constrained by their states’ requirements.  States allowing for 
postconviction relief only in response to clear and convincing evidence 
of innocence overlook the many ways that original evidence can be 
fundamentally undermined: through faulty forensic evidence, 
outdated forensic analyses, and belated discovery of official 
misconduct.  Ultimately, this disconnect between statutory 
requirements and new evidence raised through postconviction 
innocence claims can limit what progressive prosecutors might 
accomplish, even in the context of conviction integrity units. 
CIUs have taken a leading role in moving postconviction justice 
forward.  They have an advantage in the resources that they can 
devote to systematic case review; only CIU prosecutors reported 
conducting such reviews.  Whether in flawed forensics or police 
misconduct cases, prosecutors’ offices have demonstrated how 
 
124 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 28 (1970); Megan Rose, What Does an Innocent 
Man Have to Do to Go Free? Plead Guilty, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 7, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www
.propublica.org/article/what-does-an-innocent-man-have-to-do-alford-plea-guilty [https://
perma.cc/B8AU-5WUX]. 
125 See Rose, supra note 124 (detailing the ProPublica and Atlantic investigation of cases in 
Baltimore City and County in which defendants with innocence claims accepted postconviction 
plea deals). 
126 See Scheck, Conviction Integrity Units Revisited, supra note 5, at 733. 
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necessary these comprehensive case reviews can be for ensuring 
conviction integrity.127 
Still, prosecutors working outside CIUs are showing innovation as 
well.  Many of the progressive practices described herein—consulting 
with forensic experts, adopting an interests of justice mindset, 
conducting active reinvestigations—could be implemented by 
prosecutors working in a variety of contexts and in jurisdictions of 
various sizes. 
This research study has established some of the standards and 
practices that distinguish progressive from more traditional 
prosecutorial responses in the postconviction stage.  It has also 
broadened the sample of existing research by including prosecutors 
working outside of CIUs.  Still, the question remains: How would a 
more representative sample of prosecutors approach postconviction 
innocence review?  Future research efforts might therefore survey 
prosecutors’ offices more broadly, including those that have taken 
little initiative to uncover and correct wrongful convictions.  Such 
research can help better predict the parameters of prosecutors’ 
continuing role in postconviction innocence review.128 
 
127 See Chandler, supra note 41 (discussing the forensic case reviews occurring in the Texas 
units); Jason Meisner, State’s Attorney to Dismiss 18 Convictions Tied to Former Chicago Police 
Sergeant, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 17, 2017, 7:16 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local
/breaking/ct-metronald-watts-cases-20171115-story.html (reporting on the Cook County 
State’s Attorney’s Office CIU mass exoneration); Frances Robles & N.R. Kleinfield, Review of 
50 Brooklyn Murder Cases Ordered, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013
/05/12/nyregion/doubts-about-detective-haunt-50-murder-cases.html [https://perma.cc/Y2BX-
2ATJ] (reporting on the Kings County CIU case review). 
128 Among other considerations highly relevant but beyond the scope of this article include 
how to respond to postconviction due process appellate claims that allege innocence, see 
Levenson supra note 96, at 555, how to respond to clemency and pardon requests, see Rachel 
E. Barkow & Mark Osler, Restructuring Clemency: The Cost of Ignoring Clemency and a Plan 
for Renewal, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4 (2015), how to handle postconviction allegations of 
prosecutorial misconduct, see David Keenan et al., The Myth of Prosecutorial Accountability 
After Connick v. Thompson: Why Existing Professional Responsibility Measures Cannot Protect 
Against Prosecutorial Misconduct, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 203, 205 (2011), what are best 
practices for postconviction discovery, see Levenson supra note 96, at 547, how and when to 
communicate with victims in the postconviction stage, and more (see Post-Conviction Resource 
Guide, LEWIS & CLARK L. SCH., https://law.lclark.edu/centers/national_crime_victim_law
_institute/pc-resource-guide-communicating-educating-about-rights/ [https://perma.cc/LQ3E-
9XSR], and more. 
